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Abstract
On September 2, 2004, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) filed a formal request for the transfer of the Ademi & Norac case to Croatia, pursuant to Rule 11 bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“ICTY RPE”). With
this filing, the Prosecutor took an important and positive step towards giving effect to the completion strategy of the ICTY. This Article will discuss the steps taken by the ICTY and its sister
institution, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), to fulfill their mandates by
focusing only on the most senior perpetrators while ensuring that minor perpetrators do not escape liability by transferring the cases involving such individuals to national jurisdictions for trial.
Because few States have ever undergone a process of closing their criminal justice systems, there
are few precedents to guide the ICTY and ICTR leadership in the challenges that they will face in
this endeavor. The Nuremberg process, however, as the sole example of closing an international
criminal justice “system,” provides a unique spectrum through which to observe and compare the
approaches taken in the completion strategies of the ICTY and ICTR [hereinafter ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals], and should also inform the Tribunal leaders with respect to problems
that may arise in their implementation. Among the subjects at issue are the persons to be prosecuted, the courts or tribunals before which persons will appear, and the degree of cooperation
between these institutions.
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an important and positive step towards giving effect to the completion strategy of the ICTY. This Article will discuss the steps
taken by the ICTY and its sister institution, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), to fulfill their mandates by focusing only on the most senior perpetrators while ensuring that minor perpetrators do not escape liability by transferring the cases involving such individuals to national jurisdictions
for trial.

2

Because few States have ever undergone a process of closing
their criminal justice systems, there are few precedents to guide
the ICTY and ICTR leadership in the challenges that they will
face in this endeavor. The Nuremberg process,3 however, as the
* Trial Attorney, Office of the Prosecutor ("OTP"), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY'); the Author may be contacted at
thehague@wanadoo.nl. This Article discusses developments as of November 30, 2004.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the Author and are not attributable to
the Office of the Prosecutor, the ICTY, or the United Nations.
1. See Request by the Prosecutor under Rule 11 bis, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac,
Case No. IT-04-78-PT (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://wvw.un.org/icty. See generally
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("ICTY RPE"), U.N. Doc. IT/
32/Rev.34 (2005), ICTY Statute, Trial and Appeals Chambers Decisions andJudgments,
and ICTY Press Releases, available at http://www.un.org/icty.
2. For a critical assessment of the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") completion strategies and a rebuttal from the Chef de Cabinet to the
ICTY President, see Daryl A. Mundis, Judicial Effects of "Completion Strategies"for the Ad
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 98 AM. J. INr'L L. (forthcoming 2005); see also
Larry D. Johnson, Another Perspective: Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While
MaintainingInternationalHuman Rights Standardsand Excluding Impunity, 98 AM. J. INT'L
L. (forthcoming 2005).
3. This term is used to describe the International Military Tribunal ("IMT"), the
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sole example of closing an international criminal justice "system," provides a unique spectrum through which to observe and
compare the approaches taken in the completion strategies of
the ICTY and ICTR4 [hereinafter ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunals], and should also inform the Tribunal leaders with respect to problems that may arise in their implementation.
Among the subjects at issue are the persons to be prosecuted,
the courts or tribunals before which persons will appear, and the
degree of cooperation between these institutions.
There are, of course, substantial differences between the ad
hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the legal institutions
that comprised the Nuremberg process, the most obvious being
the historical conditions prevailing at the time these institutions
were created and the resulting legal instruments that led to their
formation.5 Due process considerations have also evolved in the
nearly six decades since the Nuremberg process was completed.
One must therefore be cautious in applying conclusions drawn
from Nuremberg to the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals.
Nevertheless, many of the core issues remain, and the lessons of
history should be ignored only at our peril.6
trials conducted pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, and the trials of World War II
war criminals conducted by national authorities, whether before civilian courts, military
courts-martial or tribunals. See infra Pt. I.
4. See generally International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December
1994, Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("ICTR RPE"), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1 (1995),
ICTR Statute, Trial and Appeals Chambers Decisions and Judgments, and ICTR Press
Releases, available at http://www.ictr.org.
5. The history of the Nuremberg process is set forth briefly in the following section. For a description of the establishment of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, see VIRGINIA MoRIuS & MICHAEL P. ScHiARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS (1995); see also M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAw OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); VIRGINIA MORRIS

& MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998).

The Security Council established the ICTY in 1993, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). The ICTY Statute has been amended several times to
provide for, inter alia, ad litem judges in order to expedite trials. The ICTR was created
by Security Council Resolution 955 of November 8, 1994. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). In order to maintain harmony between the two institutions, the ICTR Statute has generally been amended to
track similar changes in the ICTY Statute.
6. It is interesting to note that other internationalized or hybrid courts, such as the
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I. THE NUREMBERG PROCESS
The Nuremberg process had its genesis during a series of
conferences among the Allies held during the Second World
War.7 The first important step occurred in London with the articulation of the "St. James Declaration" of January 13, 1942, in
which nine States occupied by Nazi Germany' resolved, inter alia,
to work together to bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes
committed in Europe.9 The establishment of the United Nations War Crimes Commission ("UNWCC") in October 1943 was
the second major step, though it has since been described as "a
weak evidence-collecting body that left investigations to its member [S] tates, many of whom were under German occupation."1 °
Special Court for Sierra Leone, do not have some of the same problems as the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals, largely because they were established with a more
limited life-span and because they involved international and local staff from the outset.
Consequently, whether by design or coincidence, the most important lessons learned
from the Nuremberg process seem to have been taken into account in designing these
hybrid courts.
7. The literature on these efforts is rather extensive. See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson,
Report of Robert H. Jackson: United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials (1945) (Dep't. of State Publication No. 3080, 1949) [hereinafter
Jackson Report]; Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1949) [hereinafter
Taylor Report]; TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 3-77 (1992); GARYJONATHAN BAss, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE
POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 147-205 (2000); BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE RoAD TO
NUREMBERG (1981) [hereinafter SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERGI; BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE
AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE DOCUMENTARY RECoRD 1944-1945 (1982);JosEPH
E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL (1994).
8. These States include Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.
9. Collectively declaring that "international solidarity is necessary in order to avoid
the regression of these acts of violence simply by acts of vengeance on the part of the
general public, and in order to satisfy the sense of justice of the civilized world," these
States pledged to: (1) "place among their principal war aims the punishment, through
the channel of organized justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes,
whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them or participated in them;" and (2)
"see to it in a spirit of international solidarity, that those guilty or responsible, whatever
their nationality, are sought out, handed over to justice and judged, and that the
sentences pronounced are carried out." The Inter-Allied Declaration, Jan. 13, 1942,
reprinted in Punishment for War Crimes: The Inter-Allied Declaration signed at St.
James's Palace, London, on 13 January 1942, and Relative Documents (U.N. Office,
New York, undated).
10. BASS, supra note 7, at 149 nn.8, 10. But see Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War
Crimes and InternationalLaw, 27(450) INT'L CONCILIATION 241, 246 (1949) [hereinafter
Taylor, Nuremberg Trials] (pointing out that although the United Nations War Crimes
Commission ("UNWCC") was a "clearinghouse" rather than an "operating agency," it
was "an important center for war crimes activities" in that it received and indexed
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In any case, by the time Nuremberg was in the works, the
UNWCC was "unceremoniously killed off."'"
The third important development came during the Moscow
Conference on November 1, 1943, when Britain, the Soviet
Union, and the United States issued what later came to be
known as the "Moscow Declaration."' 2 The Declaration put
forth a two-fold objective. First, the three signatories stated:
At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers
and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the... atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order
that they may be judged and punished according to the laws
of those liberated countries and of the Free Governments
which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all
possible detail from these countries having regard especially
to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and
Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete
and other islands, to Norway, Denmark,13 the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy.
Thus, it was clearly envisaged that trials would be held on the
territory of the States where the crimes had been committed.
The reference to lists referred, to those processes already established by the UNWCC.1 4
Second, the Moscow Declaration indicated that the national
trials would be "without prejudice" to the case of the German
criminals whose crimes have "no particular geographical localization and who [would] be punished by joint decision of the
government of the Allies." 5 The concept of a trial of the "major
criminals" would subsequently result in the establishment of the
charges filed by member Nations and published lists of war crimes suspects and other
valuable information). Comprised of 17 States, the UNWCC was never joined by the
Soviet Union due to the Soviet demand that each of its 16 constituent republics be
represented on the commission. See id.
11. See BASS, supra note 7, at 149.
12. See Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, 9 DEP'T ST. BULL. 308
(1943), reprinted in 38 Am.J.INT'L L. 5 (1944) [hereinafter Moscow Declaration], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm; see also SMITH, ROAD TO
NUREMBERG, supra note 7, at 10.
13. Statement on Atrocities, Moscow Declaration, supra note 12.
14. See Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, supra note 10, at 247.
15. Statement of Atrocities, Moscow Declaration, supra note 12.
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International Military Tribunal ("IMT"), discussed below. Interestingly, even before the IMT was created, thought had already
been given to the domestic trials of low-level perpetrators. 6
Following the Moscow Declaration, the Nuremberg process
became "largely an American creation, " 1 and the topic of procedure was hotly debated both within and between the governments of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the
United States." On May 2, 1945, President Truman designated
U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson to serve
as both the U.S. Representative to negotiate with these States the
establishment of the IMT and as Chief of Counsel for the U.S.
prosecution team." A few days later, on May 7, 1945, Germany
surrendered. Due to the groundwork laid by the UNWCC, a system had already been put in place whereby theater U.S. military
commanders were in a position to apprehend and detain alleged
war criminals.2 0 Upon his appointment, Justice Jackson immediately assembled a staff and, by June 6, 1945, had delivered an
16. While the Statutes and RPE of the ad hoc. International Criminal Tribunals refer to the prosecution of "serious" violations of international humanitarian law, these
constituent documents as originally drafted were silent as to trials of some perpetrators
by national courts (though they do have provisions governing complementarity and
primacy). See Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle Of Complementarity: A New Machinery to
Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 877 (2002). Given the
large numbers of perpetrators, however, it would seem that the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunals - as with the IMT five decades earlier - would have been incapable of trying all of the alleged perpetrators, and that national courts would therefore
have to complete the task of ensuring accountability.
17. BAss, supra note 7, at 150 n.15 (citing HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 140 (1961)).
18. See Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, supra note 10, at 248; see also BAss, supra note 7, at
150-203.
19. See Exec. Order No. 9547, 10 Fed. Reg. 4961 (May 2, 1945), available at http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt9547.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
20. Taylor quotes from an order of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the effect that
they were authorized to "'apprehend and detain' war crimes suspects listed as such by
the United Nations War Crimes Commission 'without requiring further proof of their
having committed war crimes,' but the commanders were not as yet authorized to conduct any such trials." Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 3. An earlier order dated December 25, 1944, had instructed theater commanders not to try any war criminals before
military tribunals except in cases involving military security or occupation. See id. n.15.
On June 19, 1945, the theater commanders were authorized to proceed with trials (by
military tribunal) of war criminals within their custody, with the exception of those
individuals holding high political, civil or military positions. Trials of such persons were
to be deferred pending determinations as to who was an appropriate target of prosecution by the IMT or for possible transfer to another allied State for prosecution in accordance with the Moscow Declaration. See id. at 3-4, nn.17-18.
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interim report to President Truman. 2 1 Three weeks later, representatives of the United States (led by Jackson), Great Britain,
France, and the Soviet Union, met in London to begin final discussions for the trial of major war criminals. Justice Jackson's
interim report served as the blueprint for the IMT "with remark22
able prevision and clarity."
On August 8, 1945, three months after Germany surrendered, the document variously referred to as the "London Charter" or "London Agreement, "23 to which was annexed the "IMT
Charter,
was signed, and the institution which came to be
known as the "Nuremberg Tribunal" was established. 25 On November 20, 1945, the trial began, with the prosecution seeking
"declarations of criminality" for twenty-one individuals and six
"groups or organizations." 26 The trial concluded nine months
later on October 1, 1946.27
21. See Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson (June 6, 1945), in Jackson
Report, supra note 7, at 42.
22. See Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, supra note 10, at 249. Although concluding that
the IMT generally "embodied the recommendations of the Jackson [interim] report,"
Taylor does acknowledge that during the course of the negotiations concerning its establishment, "divergences of viewpoint were numerous, and several serious disagreements prolonged the discussion." Id. at 135.
23. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter London Agreement], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/
imtchart.htm.
24. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S.
280, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter IMT Charter], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm; see also DIETRICH SCHINDLER & Jili ToMAN, LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DocuMENTS 911-19 (1988).

25. Pursuant to Article 5 of the London Agreement, other member States of the
United Nations (as that term was used at the time) were invited to "adhere" to the
Agreement, of which 19 States opted to do so. See London Agreement, supra note 23,
art. 5; see also Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, supra note 10, at 257 n.18. Aside from some
general comments relevant to the present topic, the proceedings before the IMT are
beyond the scope of this Article.
26. Unlike the Statutes of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, the IMT was
empowered to declare that a "group or organization" to which one or more defendants
belonged was a "criminal organization" whose affiliates could subsequendy be prosecuted on the sole basis of their membership. See IMT Charter, supra note 24, arts. 9-11.
Among those groups listed in the IMT Indictment were the "Leadership Corps" of the
Nazi Party, the Secret Service ("SS"), the General Staff and High Command of the German Army, and the Storm Troopers ("SA"). See id.
27. The full proceedings of the IMT, including indictment, trial transcripts, judgment, and exhibits, have been published in a 42-volume set. See TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG,

14
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Although Article 22 of the IMT Charter clearly envisaged a
series of trials before the IMT, Justice Jackson made it clear that
the United States did not consider itself bound to participate in
more than one trial. 28 Based on Jackson's interim report, work
had begun, even before the IMT was constituted, on a basic war
crimes policy directive for the Allied occupational administration in Germany.29 Culminating in the issuance of a U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff directive,3 ° which formed the basis for Control
Council Law No. 10,31 a law that allowed additional individuals
to be prosecuted for war crimes.3 2
The importance of Control Council Law No. 10 cannot be
overstated, since it served as the basis for all the Nuremberg trials except for the IMT. The preamble of Control Council Law
No. 10 set forth three goals: (1) to give effect to the Moscow
Declaration; (2) to give effect to the London Agreement and
IMT Charter; and (3) to establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar ofBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER 1946 (1947-1949). For a transcript of the proceedings, as well
as additional materials, see http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
28. See Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, supra note 10, at 253-54. While maintaining that a
second IMT trial would involve certain disadvantages, Jackson nonetheless recommended as late as April 1946 that preparations should be made so that if another trial
were to commence, it could be completed promptly. See Taylor Report, supra note 7, at
24. For discussions surrounding the idea of a second IMT trial, see id. at 22-27. Additional documents concerning American participation in a second international trial of
Nazi war criminals, including Taylor's memorandum on the subject to the Secretary of
War, a reproduction of the minutes of the Chief Prosecutors on April 5, 1946 concerning this topic, and a note of the United States to the Allies informing them that the
United States would not participate in a second international trial, are also available. See
id. apps. I, J, K
29. See Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 4.
30. See Directive on the Identification and Apprehension of Persons Suspected of
War Crimes or Other Offenses and Trial of Certain Offenders, July 8, 1945, in Taylor
Report, supra note 7, app. C, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/
imtcs.htm [hereinafter Directive on the Apprehension of War Criminals].
31. See Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, in Taylor Report, supra
note 7, app. D, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imtlO.htm [hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10]. Germany was divided into four "zones of occupation" with supreme authority vested in the military commander of each respective zone.
Central authority for all of Germany was vested in the Allied Control Council, which was
comprised of the four zone commanders. Any actions taken by the Allied Control
Council required unanimity. See id.
32. See Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 6.
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fenders other than those dealt with by the IMT.Y
Nor should it go unobserved for present purposes that this
law took effect on December 20, 1945 - one month to the day
after the IMT trial began. 4 Thus, months before the IMT had
even rendered its judgment, the legal framework was already in
place for trials of serious offenders who were not prosecuted
before the IMT.15 Moreover, in light of the first prong of the
Moscow Declaration, Control Council Law No. 10 set forth standards governing the transfer, for trial, of individuals held by an
Allied government to the territorial State where the crimes had
been committed.3 6 As for the second prong, relating to "major
criminals whose offenses have no particular geographic location" and who were to be prosecuted by 'joint decision" of the
Allies, Control Council Law No. 10 complemented the proceedings held before the IMT. 7
Telford Taylor, the Chief of Council for War Crimes for the
trials conducted by the United States pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, has acknowledged that the results were "imperfectly achieved," at least with respect to the third goal of trials
under this law. 38 Taylor cites to the fact that it was only in the
U.S. and French zones that there were "systematic and mutual [ly] harmonious programs" for implementing Control Council Law No. 10. In the British zone, military courts conducted
33. See Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 31, pmbl.
34. See id.
35. Article 10 of Control Council Law No. 10 also provided for trials of the members of organizations declared criminal by the IMT. In such cases "the criminal nature
of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned." Id.art.
10. See Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 7 n.34.
36. See Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 31, arts. III-V.
37. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
38. See Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 7-8.
39. See id.at 7. Ordinance No. 7, issued by the Military Government of Germany
for the United States zone on October 18, 1946, proffered the actual authority under
which the United States implemented Control Council Law No. 10. See Ordinance No.
7: Organization and Power of Certain Military Tribunals, Oct. 18, 1946, in Taylor Report, supra note 7, app. L, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt07.
htm [hereinafter U.S. Ordinance No. 7]. Pursuant to Article II of U.S. Ordinance No.
7, the trials were officially declared to be "Military Tribunals," and were presented
before panels of three civilian judges made up of lawyers who had been admitted to
practice, for at least five years, before the highest courts of any of the U.S. States, the
District of Columbia, or the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. art. II(a)-(b). For a more
detailed discussion of Ordinance No. 7, see Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 28-32. Note
that U.S. Ordinance No. 7 was subsequently amended on February 17, 1947 by U.S.
Ordinance No. 11. See Ordinance No. 11: Amending Military Government Ordinance
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the trials under the auspices of a Royal Warrant4 ° rather than
Control Council Law No. 10, with all such cases limited only to
war crimes.4 It appears that the Soviet Union did not conduct
any trials pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10.42
As for France and the United States, however, the picture is
more optimistic. Under Control Council Law No. 10, the
United States conducted 12 Nuremberg trials, involving 185 individuals. 4' France conducted one major trial and several minor
trials in accordance with Control Council Law No. 10.44 The success of the U.S. efforts rests, in part, on the decision to establish
the machinery to prosecute the second round of trials pursuant
to Control Council Law No. 10 even before the IMT had rendered its judgment.4 5

Nevertheless, Taylor has written that "at

No. 7 of 18 October 1946, Entitled "Organization and Power of Certain Military Tribunals," Feb. 17, 1947, in Taylor Report, supra note 7, app. M, available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imtorl 1 htm.
40. See Royal Warrant - Regulation for the Trial of War Criminals, June 18, 1945,
in Taylor Report, supra note 7, app. E, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imtroyal.htm. For more on the use of the Royal Warrant to prosecute war
criminals following the Second World War, see A. P. V. Rogers, War Crimes Trials Under
the Royal Warrant: British Practice 1945-1949, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 780 (1990).
41. Under Control Council Law No. 10, the signatory States could prosecute offenders for war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and membership
in one of the organizations declared to be criminal by the IMT. See Control Council
Law No. 10, supra note 31, art. I1(1).
42. See Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, supra note 10, at 254.
43. See id. at 255. Out of a total of 185 individuals who were indicted, eight either
committed suicide or were severed from indictments due to illnesses that precluded
them from being tried. For a summary of the Nuremberg trials, see id. at 277-335, 371
(containing a statistical chart summarizing both the IMT and Control Council Law No.
10 proceedings); see also Taylor Report, supra note 7, app. A (containing a table summarizing the results of the trials and providing other basic details of the cases); GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE THE NUREMBERG

MILITARY

No. 10 (1949-53) (containing a complete record of the trials). Most of these cases are best known by their short names, reflecting
either the category of defendants (i.e., the "High Command," "Einsatzgruppen" or
"Ministries" cases) or the subject matter of the trial (i.e., the "Hostages," 'Justice" or
"Farben" cases). Additional material is available at http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu
(last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
44. See Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, supra note 10, at 254. These trials were held in the
French zone at Rastatt, near Baden-Baden. See id. Taylor notes that the principal defendant in the major trial was Hermann Roechling, a Saar Valley industrialist who "interestingly enough, had been sought and tried in absentia as a war criminal by the French
after the First World War." Id. at 254-55. Roechling had also been identified as a defendant in the event of a second IMT trial. See Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 25.
45. See Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 13-21 (discussing these efforts, which were
undertaken by the "Subsequent Proceedings Division" of the Office of the Chief of
Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality ("OCCPAC")); see also OCCPAC GenTRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw
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the outset it would have been wise to establish at the very outset
a single organization for the purpose of planning and carrying
out the war crimes trials."4 6
U.S. proceedings conducted in Nuremberg under Control
Council Law No. 10 were completed on April 14, 1949, and the
U.S. Office of Chief Counsel for War Crimes was deactivated on
June 20, 1949. 4" This did not signal the end of the war crimes
trials, however. A large number of other cases were prosecuted
before military tribunals of various Allied States, including the
United States, which held trials at both Nuremberg and
Dachau.48 Although a large number of other cases were handled before German courts, the commencement of the Cold
War focused attention elsewhere. Many of the individuals tried
by these courts received relatively light sentences. Individuals
who received longer sentences were often released from confinement after serving only a small part of their sentences.4 9
II. COMPLETION STRATEGIES FOR THE AD HOC
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's appointment of a
group of experts in the late 1990s to study ways in which to improve the efficiency of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals5" set in motion a series of measures leading to the articulation of what have come to be known as the "Completion Strategies" for the ICTY and ICTR." Pursuant to these strategies, the
eral Memorandum No, 15, Mar. 29, 1946, in Taylor Report, supra note 7, app. H, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imtmeml5.htm.
46. Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 105-06.
47. See id. at 94. The Central Secretariat for the U.S. trials pursuant to Control
Council Law No. 10 remained open slightly longer in order to finalize clemency and
other issues relating to the final case prosecuted, known as the Ministries case.
48. These cases are reported in a 15-volume set published by the UNWCC. See
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS

(1992).
49. See Amit Agarwal, The Crimes of War.. .; and How They Should and Should Not be
Judged, WVLv. STANDARD, Aug. 6, 2001, at 35 (book review).
50. See Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and
Functioningof the InternationalTribunalfor the former Yugoslavia and the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Items 142 and 143, at 64, U.N.
Doc. A/54/634 (1999); see also Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioning
of the InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 94 AmJ. Ir'L L. 759 (2000) [hereinafter Mundis,
Improving the International Criminal Tribunals]; Daryl A. Mundis, New Mechanisms for the
Enforcement of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 95 AM J. I'rr'L L. 934, 949-51 (2001).
51. These efforts, undertaken between 1999 and 2004, included amendments to
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ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals will undertake a three-

stage approach to completing their mandates.5 2 First, their Prosecutors will not issue newly investigated indictments after December 31, 2004, with the goal of completing all trials by December 31, 2008 and all appeals by December 31, 2010. Second,
they will focus their attention and resources on trying the most
senior-level military and political leaders for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed within their temporal
and territorial jurisdictions. Third, cases involving mid- and lowlevel perpetrators are to be transferred to national courts for
prosecution, so as to avoid allowing the guilty to escape criminal
accountability.5"
The development of the completion strategies has been a
linear process which may be traced to the "Rules of the Road"
program established by the Rome Agreement of February 18,
1996."4 Pursuant to this agreement, between Croatia, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, war
crimes investigations pursued by the authorities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina were to be submitted to the ICTY Prosecutor for
review prior to an arrest warrant, indictment and proceeding to
trial before domestic courts. The ICTY Prosecutor has reviewed
and classified several thousand dossiers for further action by 10the RPE of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, with particular emphasis on:
(1) improvements to the efficiency of pre-trial management to expedite cases; (2) the
creation of ad litem judicial positions to increase the capacity to adjudicate cases; (3)
amendments to the ICTY RPE allowing cases to be transferred to national courts for
prosecution; and (4) the amendment of ICTY Rule 28(A) which provides that when the
Prosecutor files an indictment for confirmation, the ICIY Bureau (consisting of the
ICTY President, Vice-President and PresidingJudges of the three Trial Chambers) shall
have the power to "determine whether the indictment, primafacie,concentrates on one
or more of the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal." Concerning points (1) and (2), see Mundis,
Improving the InternationalCriminal Tribunals, supra note 50; see also Daryl A. Mundis,
The Election of ad litem Judges and Other Developments at the InternationalCriminal Tribunals,
14 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 851 (2001). Points (3) and (4) are discussed in greater detail
below.
52. See Press Release, ICTY, Address by His Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the United
Nations Security Council 1 (July 26, 2002) [hereinafter July 2002 Security Council Comments].
53. See id.
54. See ICTY Yearbook 1998, at 255. Notwithstanding the "Rules of the Road" program, little international support was devoted to restoring the infrastructure required
for the States of the former Yugoslavia to actually prosecute the cases approved under
the Rome Agreement. The "Rules of the Road" program came to an end in late 2004.
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cal prosecutors. The Rules of the Road function was transferred
to the Prosecutor at the Bosnia and Herzegovina State Court on
October 1, 2004. More recently, on June 10, 2002, the ICTY
President submitted to the U.N. Security Council a report outlining the steps to complete the mandate of the ICTY.5 5 The President of the Security Council endorsed the plan shortly after it
was presented,5 6 and the ICTY President and Prosecutor further

articulated these policies in speeches to the Security Council in
20025' and 2003.58 The ICTR initially submitted a document in
July 2003 setting forth its completion strategy. 59 It then forwarded a revised plan in September 2003.60 Security Council

Resolutions 1503 and 1534 strongly endorsed the completion
strategies of both ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals.6 1
55. See Report on theJudicial Status of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the former
Yugoslavia and the Prospectsfor Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, U.N. SCOR, 57th
Sess., Enclosure, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678 (2002) [hereinafter ICTY Completion Strategy].
56. See Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/2002/21 (2002).
57. SeeJuly 2002 Security Council Comments, supra note 52; see also Press Release,
ICTY, Address by His Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council
(Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter October 2002 Security Council Comments]; Press Release,
ICTY, Address by Ms. Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council (Oct. 30,
2002) [hereinafter ICTY Prosecutor October 2002 Security Council Comments].
58. See Press Release, ICTY, Statement of judge Theodor Meron, President of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council (Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter October 2003 Security Council Comments];
see also Press Release, ICTY, Address by Ms. Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council (Oct. 10, 2003). These remarks were also set forth in a Security Council
Meeting. See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4838th mtg. at 3-7, 9-13, U.N. Doc S/PV.4838
(2003).
59. See Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N.
GAOR, 58th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 133, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/58/269 (2003); see also
Seventh Annual Report of the ICTR, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess.,
21-23, U.N. Doc. A/57/
163-S/2002/733 (2002).
60. See Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N.
SCOR, 58th Sess., Enclosure, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/2003/946 (2003) (hereinafter ICTR
Completion Strategy]. The ICTR President and Prosecutor also addressed the Security
Council on October 9, 2003 with respect to their efforts in developing a comprehensive
Completion Strategy for the ICTR. See October 2003 Security Council Comments, supra
note 58, at 7-9, 13-16. Shortly thereafter, ICTR ProsecutorJallow conducted a review of
all cases and on-going investigations undertaken by his office and, on February 28,
2004, compiled a document entitled, "Completion Strategy of the Office of the Prosecutor." See U.N. Doc. S/2004/341, n.2 (2004) (unpublished document).
61. See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4817th mtg., 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1503 (2003); see also S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4935th mtg., 3, U.N. Doc.
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The ICTY President and Prosecutor have consistently indicated that the completion strategy is predicated in part on the
timely arrest of indicted individuals and on timely access to evidence.62 Security Council Resolution 1503 emphasized the duty
of States to ensure that the completion strategies succeed by assisting in the process, noting that an "essential prerequisite to
achieving the objectives of the ICTY and ICTR completion strategies is full cooperation by all States, especially in apprehending
6 3
all remaining at-large persons indicted by the ICTY and ICTR.
The United States, an early advocate of the completion strategies,6 4 supports this position, as do other permanent members of
the Security Council.6 5
S/RES/1534 (2004). Citing to the need to ensure adherence to the completion strate-

gies, Resolution 1503 split the prosecutorial functions of the ICTY and ICTR. See S.C.
Res. 1503, supra, 8. Prior to this resolution, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals shared a common Chief Prosecutor, which contributed to, among other things,
uniform policies with respect to prosecuting offenders before the ICTY and ICTR.
62. The ICTY leadership has been consistent in stating that the completion strategy target dates are conditioned on the apprehension and trial by the ICTY of Radovan
Karad~it, Ratko Mladit, and Ante Gotovina. See, e.g., ICTY Completion Strategy, supra note
55, 15; October 2003 Security Council Comments, supra note 58, at 5-6; ICTY Prosecutor October 2002 Security Council Comments, supra note 57, at 3-4; October 2002 Security Council Comments, supra note 57, at 1; July 2002 Security Council Comments,
supra note 52, at 2; Press Release, ICTY, Address by Ms. Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the United
Nations Security Council (Nov. 27, 2001) [hereinafter ICTY Prosecutor November 2001
Security Council Comments]. Moreover, in early May of 2004, the ICTY president, acting in furtherance to ICTY Rule 7 bis, forwarded to the Security Council a report of the
Prosecutor setting forth a pattern of "consistent failure on the part of Serbia and Montenegro to comply with its obligations" under the ICTY Statute and RPE. See Press Release, ICTY, Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, Reports Serbia and Montenegro's Non-cooperation, to the
Security Council (May 4, 2004). The President noted that these failures "are detrimental to the expectations placed upon the Tribunal by its completion strategy and could
seriously impinge on the Tribunal's ability to meet those expectations." Id.
63. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 61. The resolution also referred to the need to
arrest Karadfie, Mladie, and Gotovina, as well as Felicien Kabuga, an ICTR indictee. See
id.
2-3. Of course, for the tribunals constituting the Nuremberg process, arrest of
those most responsible for the crimes committed by Nazi Germany was not a major
impediment since most of them (with the exception of Hitler, G6bbels and Eichmann)
were already in custody. See Taylor Report, supra note 7, at 5, 51-52 (discussing the
efforts to determine who should be arrested for trial before the Nuremberg tribunals);
see also Directive on the Apprehension of War Criminals, supra note 30.
64. See, e.g., Amb. Pierre-Richard Prosper, War Crimes and State Responsibility for
Justice, Remarks at OSCE Conference in Belgrade (June 15, 2002), available at http://
belgrade.usembassy.gov/press/2002/020615.html; see also War Crimes: United States
"Forcedto Practice What it Preaches", INTr'L JUSTICE TRIB., May 24, 2004, at 5.
65. At the time Security Council Resolution 1534 passed, both the United States
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In adopting Resolution 1534, the Security Council ordered
the Prosecutors of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals to
review their respective caseloads with a view to determining
which cases should be transferred to "competent national jurisdictions."6 6 All new indictments must also be based on charges
relating to only "the most senior leaders" suspected of being
"most responsible" for crimes within the relevant tribunal's jurisdiction.6 7
Resolution 1534 also require the leaders of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals to present biannual reports to the
Security Council concerning progress made towards reaching
the goals of the completion strategies.6 8 In May and November
2004, the Presidents and Prosecutors of the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunals articulated their progress in complying with
the completion strategies, while also pointing out remaining difand France reiterated their strong support for the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals in their efforts to bring those most responsible for crimes in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda to justice. See US. Favors Trial of War Crime Fugitives, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Mar. 26, 2004.
66. See S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 61,
4.
67. See id. 5. This has been the official policy of the ICTY Prosecutor since as
early as October 2002. See October 2002 Security Council Comments, supra note 57, at
4. But see ICTY Prosecutor November 2001 Security Council Comments, supra note 62,
at 1.
68. See S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 61,
6-7. As of late November 2004, both ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals had filed reports. For the ICTY reports, see U.N. Doc.
S/2004/420 (2004) [hereinafter ICTY May 2004 Report]; see also Press Release, ICTY,
Address ofJudge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council (Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Meron Press Release]; Press Release, ICTY, Comments by Judge Theodor Meron,
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the
United Nations Security Council (Nov. 29, 2004); Press Release, ICT1Y, Address by Carla
Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
to the United Nations Security Council (Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Del Ponte Press
Release]. For the ICTR reports, see U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2004/
341 [hereinafter ICTR May 2004 Report]; see also Press Release, ICTR, ICTR President
and Prosecutor Update Security Council on Completion Strategy (Nov. 24, 2004) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy Press Release]. On June 29, 2004, the ICTR President and Prosecutor reported to the Security Council that the ICTR was "on schedule"
to complete its trials by 2008, as required by Security Council Resolution 1503. See Press
Release, ICTR, President and Prosecutor Update Security Council on Completion Strategy (July 6, 2004). At that time, ICTR Prosecutor Jallow indicated that he intends to
transfer five of the currently detained accused to national courts for trial, while anticipating that at least four indictees who are at large, as well as some other individuals to
be indicted, will probably be transferred as well, in accordance with ICTR Rule 11 bis.
See id.
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ficulties.69 The Security Council was presented with basic statistics concerning the accomplishments of the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunals thus far. v" The ICTY Prosecutor informed
the Council that six investigations remained open and were
69. The ICTY Prosecutor identified three primary obstacles: (1) the reluctance of
certain States to arrest and transfer individuals indicted by the ICTY; (2) the ability and
willingness of the States of the former Yugoslavia "to proceed with trials, while ensuring
that those trials will be led in accordance with the highest judicial standards"; and (3)
the lack of resources to maintain steady progress in fulfilling the ICTYs mandate. See
Del Ponte Press Release, supra note 68. With respect to the second potential obstacle,
the leaders of the ICTY have noted this problem before. See ICTY May 2004 Report, supra
note 68,
27-28; see also U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4837th mtg., U.N. Doc S/PV.4837
(Oct. 8, 2003); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Briefed on Establishment of War Crimes Chamber Within State Court of Bosnia And Herzegovina, U.N.
Doc. SC/7888 (Oct. 8, 2003). Several organizations have also been critical of the progress made to date of the courts of the former Yugoslavia in prosecuting war crimes
cases, while commenting on the potential for the situation to improve in the near future. See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Justice Cannot be Achieved on the Cheap (Nov. 12, 2003); Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina Shelving Justice: War Crimes Prosecutions in Paralysis (Nov. 12, 2003), availableat
http://www.amnestyusa.org [hereinafter Amnesty International Bosnia Report]; Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe ("OSCE"), Supplementary Report:
War Crimes Proceedings in Croatia and Findings from Trial Monitoring (Jun. 22,
2004), available at http://www.osce.org/documents; Press Release, OSCE, OSCE Mission to Croatia Report Finds Ethnic Serbs "Disadvantaged" in War Crimes Trials (Mar.
1, 2004). Based on the monitoring of 75 trials, one OSCE report noted, inter alia, that
in absentia proceedings were almost exclusively utilized in cases involving Serb perpetrators; that significant differences existed between rates of convictions and acquittals between Serbs and Croats; and that the length of proceedings "on both ends of the spectrum" as well as delays in the proceedings were major causes for concern. See OSCE,
Mission to Croatia, Background Report: Domestic War Crimes Trials 2002 (Mar. 1,
2004), available at http://www.osce.org/documents; see also Council of Europe, Serbia
and Montenegro: Compliance with Obligations and Commitments and Implementation of the Post-Accession Co-Operation Programme, Apr. 30, 2004,
28-34. The European Commission, in considering Croatia's application for EU membership, has also
raised concerns about Croatia's progress towards prosecuting war crimes cases. See
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership in the European Union, COM (2004) 257 Final 31.
70. As of November 23, 2004, the ICTY had completed trials in 18 cases; of the 36
accused, 17 pleaded guilty, three of whom entered pleas mid-trial. Also as of that date,
five trials were underway (Krajiknik, Miloevie, Limaj, Hadzhasanovie & Kubura, and
Ori), while two other cases (Strugar and Jokic) had been completed with Trial Chambers yet to render their judgments. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case IT-01-42-T, [2004]
Int'l Crim. Trib. Fmr. Yugoslavia 9; Prosecutor v. Jokit, Case IT-02-60-T, [2004] Int'l
Crim. Trib. Fmr. Yugoslavia 6. Thus, as of November 23, 2004, the ICTY had completed
or was conducting proceedings involving 60 accused in 24 trials and 15 separate guilty
plea proceedings. See Meron Press Release, supra note 68. As of the same date, the
ICTR had rendered judgments with respect to a total of 23 persons and was in the
process of trying 25 persons, bringing to 48 the number of persons whose trials were
either completed or underway. See ICTR Completion Strategy Press Release, supra note
68. The ICTR President has estimated that the total number of persons to be tried
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likely to result in additional indictments by December 31,
2004. 7 ' The investigative target of the ICTY was in fact met prior
to the deadline. The ICTR Prosecutor informed the Security
Council in May 2004 that he had reduced the number of suspects facing indictment from twenty-six to sixteen and that he
was planning on transferring certain cases to national courts for
trial.7 2 The ICTR has already completed its investigative work
and will produce its final indictments in 2005.
The ICTY RPE have been amended twice to facilitate the
completion strategy. First, Rule 11 bis was amended to provide
for the transfer of ICTY cases to domestic courts." The ICTR
RPE were also amended to incorporate this provision. Second,
ICTY RPE Rule 28 was amended to provide a role for the ICTY
judges in determining whether a potential indictee is "senior"
enough to merit indictment by the ICTY.74

The ICTR judges

declined to adopt a similar rule for the Arusha-based Tribunal.
ICTY RPE Rule 11 bis was amended in June 2004 so as to
permit the Trial Chambers to refer cases to any State: (1) where
the crime was committed; (2) where the accused was arrested; or
(3) having jurisdiction and being willing and prepared to accept
the case for trial.7 5 Regardless of where the case is referred, the
Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the accused will receive a
fair trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.7 6 The Trial Chamber may refer cases either proprio
motu or upon the request of the Prosecutor, and permits the parbefore that tribunal could be in the range of 65-70 by the time its mandate is complete.
See ICTR May 2004 Report, supra note 68, 62.
71. The ICTY Prosecutor reported that two of these indictments could be joined
with two existing cases, with the result that the open investigations are likely to add a
maximum of four additional trials to be carried out in The Hague. See Del Ponte Press
Release, supra note 68. In May 2004, the ICTY Prosecutor informed the Security Council that, between October 2003 and May 2004, she had issued five new indictments and
unsealed an additional indictment. See ICTY May 2004 Report, supra note 68,
7-13.
72. See ICTR May 2004 Report, supra note 68,
4-7, 36-39.
73. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
74. See ICTY RPE Rule 28 (1994) (amended 1996).
75. The third prong was added at a plenary in June 2004, while the first two prongs
were the product of amendments to the ICTY RPE in September 2002. The notion of
referring cases to States for trial was discussed by the ICTYJudges as early as September
2000, but rejected. See Report on the Operation of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the
former Yugoslavia, Submitted by Judge Claude Jorda, President, on Behalf of the Judges of the
Tribunal, U.N. Doc. A/55/382-S/2000/865,
47-52 (2000).
76. See ICTY RPE Rule 11 bis(B) (1997) (amended 2002). The ICTY President
may assign cases following indictment to a Trial Chamber for the specific purpose of
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ties to be heard on the issues.77 The ICTY Prosecutor anticipates
that, by the end of 2004, eleven indicted cases concerning twenty
accused will have been proposed to the Chambers for transfer to
domestic jurisdictions in accordance with
Rule 11 bis of the
78
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
An essential component of this portion of the completion
strategy rests with the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
("BH State Court"),7 9 which was established on November 12,
2000, by Wolfgang Petritsch, the then High Representative for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting pursuant to his authority under
Article V of Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement.8 ° In May 2002,
an expert group (appointed by the Office of the High Representative ("OHR")), recommended the creation, within the BH
State Court, of a special International Humanitarian Law Division (later referred to as the "War Crimes Chamber") with specific jurisdiction to prosecute serious violations of international
humanitarian law. 8 ' In June 2002, then-ICTY President Jorda
submitted the ICTY Completion Strategy Document to the Seinvoking Rule 11 bis, even in situations where the accused is not in custody. See ICTY
RPE Rule 11 bis(A).
77. See ICTY RPE Rule 11 bis(B). The rule is silent as to whether the accused may
seek the transfer of his case to a State that meets the conditions set forth in Rule 11 bis.
See id.
78. See Del Ponte Press Release, supra note 68. For progress made by the ICTR in
laying the foundation for transferring cases, see ICTR Completion Strategy Press Release, supra note 68; see also ICTR May 2004 Report, supra note 68, 9J 36-39; ICTR Completion Strategy, supra note 60,
36-39.
79. For press reports on war crimes trials conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
see Aria Uzelac, Can Balkan Courts Be Trusted With TribunalCases?, Institute for War and
Peace Reporting ("IWPR") Tribunal Update No. 358 (May 15, 2004), availableat http:/
/www.iwpr.net; see also Merdijana Sadovit, Teething Problems for Bosnian Courts, IWPR
Tribunal Update No. 358 (May 15, 2004); First War Crimes Trial of Serb Starts in Republika
Srpska, SOUTHEAST EUR. TIMES, May 17, 2004; Mostar: Investigation Against 900 Persons
Suspected of War Crimes, FED'N NEws AGENCY, June 8, 2004, available at http://www.fena.
ba/uk; Dnevne Nezavisne Novine, Fifty Indictmentsfor War Crimes Before BiH Court?, DAILY
INDEP. NEWSP., June 9, 2004, available at http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/tfeno/Feature_
Story.asp?Article=85514.
80. See Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative, High
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Wolfgang Petritsch, Decision Imposing the
Law on the State Court of BiH (Nov. 12, 2000), available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions; see also Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nov. 10, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170.
81. See Consultants' Report to OHR, The Future of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2, 10-14 (on file with author); see also Press Office,
OHR, BiH Media Round-up (May 9, 2002), available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/
presso; July 2002 Security Council Comments, supra note 52, at 3.
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curity Council. A key component of that strategy was the transfer of cases involving "lower-level and intermediate accused" to
regional courts so that the ICTY could complete all trials by
2008.82 President Jorda subsequently recommended the establishment of the War Crimes Chamber as proposed by OHR.83
The War Crimes Chamber, which came into existence in January
2005,84 was never envisioned as a "mini-international Tribunal"
in Sarajevo, but rather a national court with temporary international support for the purpose of guarantying its impartiality and
independence8 5 The Security Council warmly received this gen8 6
eral approach.
82. See ICTY Completion Strategy, supra note 55,
59-69. The ICTY President originally envisioned a three-tiered approach, with the ICTY trying the most serious cases,
the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("BH State Court") prosecuting intermediary-level accused, and the lower level domestic courts handling low-ranking accused
pursuant to the Rome Agreement. See id. 69; see alsoJuly 2002 Security Council Comments, supra note 52, at 4.
83. SeeJuly 2002 Security Council Comments, supra note 52, at 4. As noted above,
Amnesty International has criticized the plan to transfer cases to the BH State Court on
the grounds that the Bosnian authorities are not yet in a position to satisfy international
standards in conducting such trials. See Amnesty International Bosnia Report, supra
note 69. Amnesty International contends that the War Crimes Chamber of the State
Court "could be a first step in tackling the challenging task, but only if part of a wider
strategy which embraces the entire Bosnian criminal justice system dealing with cases of
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes." Id. at 1-2. Concluding that this is
not the case, Amnesty International disagrees with this aspect of the ICTY Completion
Strategy, arguing that its purpose is to "affect the quickest and cheapest possible withdrawal of the international community and the acceleration of the exit strategy of the
Tribunal." Id. at 2. Amnesty International has thus concluded that the completion
strategy process is being rushed and that the plan is "unrealistic and insufficiently detailed" and will "significantly undermine the battle against impunity" since only a relatively few individuals will be prosecuted before the State Court. Id. In the same report,
it also criticized the trials being conducted by entity and cantonal courts as well as the
role provided for such courts in the ICTY Completion Strategy. See id. at 3-5; see also
ICTY May 2004 Report, supra note 68,
24, 29.
84. Although no specialized War Crimes Chamber had been established prior to
January 2005, the BH State Court has jurisdiction to prosecute such cases; it is anticipated that it will begin receiving cases from the ICTY in January 2005. See Preliminary
Order in Response to the Prosecutor's Request under Rule 11 bis, Prosecutor v.
Mejakie et al., Case No. IT-02-65-PT (Sept. 22, 2004),
8, available at http://www.un.
org/icty [hereinafter Mejaki( Preliminary Order]. War crimes cases will be prosecuted
by the BH State Prosecutor's Special Department for Organized Crime, Economic
Crimes and Corruption.
85. See July 2002 Security Council Comments, supra note 52, at 3 ("In practical
terms, a limited number of key posts would be set aside for international judges for a
restricted time").
86. See Statement by the President of the Security Council, supra note 56; see also S.C. Res.
1503, supra note 61, pmbl.
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Although the elaborate steps taken to establish and properly
fund the BH State Court are beyond the scope of this Article,8 7 a
rudimentary understanding of this court is necessary in order to
appreciate how it fits into the ICTY completion strategy. The
BH State Court is authorized to apply the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and has jurisdiction over three types of war crimes
cases: those referred from the ICTY pursuant to Rule 11 bis,88
investigations dossiers deferred by the ICTY Prosecutor for
which no indictment has been issued,89 and "Rules of the Road"
cases pending before domestic courts but which, due to their
sensitivity, should be tried at the State Court level.9" The Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina was amended to give the
BH State Court jurisdiction over all serious criminal cases, including war crimes.9 1 The procedural rules for the BH State
Court as well as the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and
Herzegovina were also amended so as to render evidence gathered by ICTY investigators admissible before the BH State
Court.9 2 For an initial period, there will be an international
component of the BH State Court, to include international

87. For a discussion on these developments, see Press Release, ICTY, Statement by
President Meron on Establishment of Special War Crimes Chamber in Bosnian State
Court (June 13, 2003); see also Press Release, ICTY, Statement of Judge Theodor
Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe "U.S. Helsinki Commission" (Oct. 8, 2003); U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4837th mtg., U.N. Doc S/PV.4837
(2003) (Meeting Record); Press Release, United Nations, Security Council Briefed on
Establishment of War Crimes Chamber Within State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Oct. 8, 2003), U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4837th mtg., U.N. Doc SC/7888 (2003); Twentyfifth Report of the High Representativefor the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia
and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. S/2004/126, Enclosure (2004); Press
Release, OHR, First Meeting of the Joint Executive Board of the BiH Special War
Crimes Chamber Implementation Project (Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.ohr.
int/ohr-dept/presso; ICTY Weekly Press Briefing (Apr. 28, 2004), available at www.un.
org/icty/briefing/2004/PBO40414.htm.
88. See Press Release, ICTY, OHR-ICTY Working Group on Development of BiH
Capacity for War-Crimes Trial Successfully Completed (Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter
Working Group Press Release].
89. These cases involve approximately 45 suspects. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Press Release, ICTY, Donors Raise 15.7 Million Euros for War Crimes
Chamber of BiH Court (Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Donors Press Release].
92. See id.
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judges, prosecutors and court management personnel, for a
"transitional period of up to five years."9"
As noted above, the ICTY Prosecutor first invoked Rule 11
bis in September 2004, seeking to transfer three cases involving
seven accused to national courts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. On September 2, 2004, she filed a request to transfer
the Ademi & Norac case (involving two accused) to Croatia,9 4
prompting ICTY President Theodor Meron to appoint a Trial
Chamber to consider this request. 5 Similar requests were subsequently filed on September 2 and September 21, 2004, seeking
to transfer the Mejakie and the Stankovie cases, respectively, (involving four accused and one accused, respectively) to the BH
State Court.9 6

Upon receipt of the Mejakie Request, the ICTY

President wrote a letter to the Senior Deputy High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, seeking his advice as to whether
there was any court in Bosnia "presently capable of trying persons accused of war crimes in a manner which meets international human rights and due process standards."9 7 In his response, the Senior Deputy High Representative wrote, inter alia,
93. See id.; see also Working Group Press Release, supra note 88.
94. See Request by the Prosecutor under Rule 11 bis, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac,
Case No. IT-04-78-PT (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty. The ICTY
Prosecutor noted that no other State had indicated that it had jurisdiction or was willing and adequately prepared to accept the case; that Croatia has territorial jurisdiction
over the case; and that the Croatian authorities had indicated that they were willing and
prepared to accept the case for prosecution. See id.
20, 21. She also pointed out that
recent OSCE Reports support her position that progress has been made with respect to
the integrity of the Croatian judiciary as that system relates to the prosecution of war
crimes cases. See id. 23.
95. See Order Appointing a Trial Chamber for the Purposes of Determining
Whether the Indictment Should be Referred to Another Court Under Rule 11 bis,
Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT (Sept. 7, 2004). As of late November 2004, this
Trial Chamber had not yet rendered a decision on whether to transfer the case.
96. The Prosecutor's requests concerning these cases are not available on the ICTY
web-site. As discussed infra, the ICTY President took steps following the filing of the
Mejakie Request to determine whether the courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina were prepared to begin receiving cases from the ICTY. This issue had not yet been resolved at
the time that the request was filed in the Stankovi case, and the ICTY President deferred consideration of the Stankovi6 Request pending the filing of the Mejakie Prosecutor's Supplementary Motion on September 29, 2004. See Preliminary Order in Response
to the Prosecutor's Motion Under Rule 11 bis, Prosecutor v. Stankovit, Case No. IT-9623/2-PT (Sept. 27, 2004).
97. Mejakit Preliminary Order, supra note 84, 8. The President wrote this letter
after concluding that, based upon information contained in the Prosecutor's Request,
it would be possible for the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to begin prosecuting
war crimes cases transferred from the ICTY in January 2005. See id. 7.

2005]

AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

611

that from the perspective of OHR, it would not be possible for
the BH State Court to meet international due process standards
prior to January 2005, and that it was consequently premature to
transfer any cases. 98 In addition, he wrote that "Any premature
referral to [Bosnia and Herzegovina] before January could even
undermine the current efforts to establish that capacity."99 The
ICTY President then concluded:
This is an unusual case. It involves some tension among the
need for efficient judicial management of Trial Chamber resources, the need to safeguard Defendants' procedural rights,
and the need to effectuate the basic judicial function of the
Tribunal 0 0
Consequently, after discussing the matter with the Bureau,
the ICTY President offered the Prosecutor the opportunity to
file a supplemental brief on the extent to which Bosnia and Herzegovina was capable of referring Defendants' case to a competent court "forthwith, "101 and addressing her view that Bosnia

and Herzegovina would "provide all necessary legal and technical conditions for fair trials."'0 2 On September 29, 2004, the
Prosecutor filed her Supplementary Motion, 01 3 arguing that
since it is anticipated that the BH State Court will be operational
in January 2005, her requests were not premature, and that
there were good reasons for assigning the matter to a Trial
Chamber for its consideration. 0 4 The ICTY President agreed,
and assigned the cases to a Trial Chamber for its consideration
10 5
as to whether the transfer of these cases was appropriate.
98. See id. 7 8-9.
99. Id. 8.
100. Id. 1 10.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting from
29 of the Prosecutor's Request).
103. As with the original request, this document is not available on the ICTY website.
104. The ICTY Prosecutor argued that "coherent planning and efficient judicial
management, both at the Tribunal and in [Bosnia and Herzegovina]" supported her
argument that it was not premature to transfer the cases. Order Transferring a Motion
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, Mejakie et al., Case No. IT-02-65-PT (Oct. 4, 2004),
3 (citing
Prosecutor's Supplementary Brief, 7 8, 10). See Order Transferring a Motion Pursuant
to Rule 11 bis, Stankovie, Case No. IT-96-23/2 (Oct. 4, 2004),
3 (citing Prosecutor's
Supplementary Brief, 77 8, 10).
105. See Order Appointing a Trial Chamber for the Purposes of Determining
Whether the Indictment Should be Referred to Another Court Under Rule 11 bis,
Mejaki6 et al.; see also Order Appointing a Trial Chamber for the Purposes of Determin-
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The second amendment to the ICTY RPE to have an impact
upon the completion strategy was adopted at a plenary in April
2004. This was a few days after the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1534, in which ICTYJudges amended ICTY RPE Rule
28(A) giving the Bureau1 " 6 a role in determining whether or not
an indictment involved "the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."1 °7 Notably, the ICTRJudges declined to adopt a similar
rule for the ICTR, regarding the amendment as a statutory violation limiting prosecutorial independence. 0 8 Nonetheless, given
the ICTY Prosecutor's stated intention to focus her remaining
investigations only on senior military and political leaders, the
amendment is likely to have little impact.0 9
The net result of these developments and efforts may be
summarized as follows: First, the ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunals are on schedule. The ICTY has met the December 31,
2004 deadline for completing investigations and is on track to
complete all trials by December 31, 2008 and all appeals by December 31, 2010. Second, efforts will be made to focus the limited resources devoted to the ICTY and ICTR on prosecuting
those individuals accused of being most responsible for the
crimes committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In this
connection, the dates for the completion of trials and appeals
seem to be contingent on the arrest, transfer and trial by the
ICTY and ICTR of those accused bearing significant responsibility for crimes committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,
specifically including Radovan Karadi, Ratko Mladie, Ante
Gotovina, and Felicien Kabuga. Third, the ad hoc International
ing Whether the Indictment Should be Referred to Another Court Under Rule 11 bis,
Stankovie.
106. The bureau consists of the ICTY President, Vice-President, and the Presiding
Judges of the three Trial Chambers. See ICTY RPE Rule 23 (1994).
107. ICTY RPE Rule 28(A) (1994) (amended 1996).
108. See Good Enough for The Hague, Not Good Enough for Arusha, SE. NEWS SERVICE
EUR., Apr. 27, 2004, available at http://www.sense-agency.com.
109. This has been the official policy of the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY
since as early as October 2002: "I have dramatically prioritized our investigative objectives, for both Tribunals, and further focused our efforts on 'the main civilian, military
andparamilitary leaders' so that we can now reasonably expect to fulfill the essence of our
prosecution missions for both Tribunals by the end of 2004." ICTY Prosecutor October
2002 Security Council Comments, supra note 57, at 4 (emphasis in original). Note that
these comments were made when the ICTY Prosecutor was also the Chief Prosecutor
for the ICTR.
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Criminal Tribunals will soon begin transferring cases involving
mid- and lower-level perpetrators to domestic courts for trial.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND APPLICABLE LESSONS
The biggest hurdles to be overcome in completing the mandates of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals clearly relate to the willingness of States, particularly those in the former
Yugoslavia, to live up to their obligations to arrest and transfer
all outstanding indictees into the custody of the ICTY, and to
ensure that their national judiciaries can be entrusted to provide
trials that meet international due process standards so that cases
can be transferred for prosecution. In these two respects, the
Nuremberg process offers few lessons, since the arrest of major
war criminals was not a significant problem, with the major exception of those leaders who escaped liability by committing suicide. Similarly, since the majority of the major offenders were
tried by the IMT, under Control Council Law No. 10 or by other
Allied military tribunals, German courts, under the watchful eyes
of military occupation authorities, were left to deal only with minor perpetrators.
Nevertheless, in many respects, the completion strategies
for the ad hoc International Tribunals resemble the Nuremberg
process. In both instances, the international community focused
its resources on major offenders, while national courts (or military tribunals conducted by Allied States in the case of the postWorld War II cases) were given primary responsibility for midand lower-level perpetrators. In both instances, the United
States was a major proponent in initiating the use of courts to
prosecute offenders, before seemingly losing patience with the
process and encouraging the development of alternative methods to expedite the process.
One of the big advantages of the Control Council Law No.
10 prosecutions stemmed from the availability of the IMT infrastructure, which facilitated the success of the follow-on trials.
Similarly, Taylor was successful in encouraging some of the IMT
staff to remain in Nuremberg for the subsequent trials. Unfortunately, due to limited resources, there is no indication that the
ICTY or ICTR will be able to provide staff to assist with the prosecution of cases before national courts. Given that the legal and
investigative staffs of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
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were the ones who developed and prepared these cases, this may
make things a bit more difficult. If funding by the international
community were to be made available, it would likely prove to be
of great assistance in efforts to ensure continuity in the prosecution of such cases.
As noted above, Taylor has described the utility of having an
overall plan for conducting the war crimes trials at Nuremberg. 1 0 The completion strategies for the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunals present a comprehensive plan for tulfilling
the mandates of the ICTY and ICTR, but not all of the pieces are
yet to come together. The international community needs to ensure that the national courts to which the ICTY and ICTR seek to
transfer cases have the requisite resources to undertake these important trials. International organizations and NGOs will play
an important role in ensuring that the rights of the accused are
respected while also ensuring that impunity does not result.
Trial monitoring will not be the end of the process, though, as it
will be necessary to confirm that individuals convicted by national courts actually serve their sentences in conformity with national laws and are not prematurely released from imprisonment
as was the case with many of the Germans prosecuted by German courts following World War II.
If the processes envisioned by the completion strategies for
the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals come to pass, the
mandates for these judicial institutions should be achieved in
fewer than six years. The international community's continuing
resolve to overcome the remaining obstacles will be crucial in
determining whether the completion strategies succeed. As the
final chapters on the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals are
being written, it will be extremely important to balance competing values - accountability for the perpetrators, ensuring that
perpetrators receive fair and expeditious trials, and ensuring justice for the victims and their families. Whether by design or by
coincidence, the completion strategies seem to have generally
adhered to the approach taken by the Nuremberg process. One
remains hopeful that with the transfer of cases to national jurisdictions, the ICTY and ICTR will take to heart these lessons

110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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learned and provide whatever institutional support is necessary
-

within the confines of limited resources -

to ensure that

these competing values are reconciled to the maximum extent
possible.

